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Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings Estimates 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates consensus and individual analyst firm accuracy in forecasts of earnings 
per share (EPS) for U.S. stocks in 2009–2018. Moreover, we investigate if the analysts’ 
forecasting predictiveness is affected by the size of the company which is observed. Finally, we 
examine if differently weighted models can beat an equally weighted consensus forecast. We 
find statistical evidence that analysts’ forecasts of EPS have predictive power. Furthermore, we 
find that the size of a company impacts the predictive ability of analysts. Analysts of larger 
companies, included in S&P 500, are more accurate in their forecasts, relative to analysts of 
smaller companies, included in Russell 2000. Finally, after categorizing the analyst firms by 
predictiveness, we create models to explore the possibility of beating the average with weighted 
combinations. Our results show that none of the suggested models are statistically significantly 
different from the consensus and therefore we cannot conclude that differently weighted models 
outperform an equally weighted consensus. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
 
Analysts are in the business of selling their opinions, but are their forecasts worth the price? 
Predicting the future in all fields of finance has been proven to be a difficult task (Timmermann, 
2018), and has for several reasons been questioned if it is valuable at all. A financial analyst is 
expected to produce reliable forecasts of earnings, growth, and company performance. 
Financial analysts are an important part of the financial system and their analysis affects stock 
prices, at least in the short term (Hilary and Hsu, 2013).  
 
Numerous researchers have conducted studies on topics related to the challenges and difficulties 
in financial forecasting. Bias in financial forecasting has been observed for instance by Sedor 
(2002), and Hilary and Hsu (2013). However, these studies are somewhat contradictory, mainly 
derived from the effects of intentional- and unintentional bias. Whilst Sedor suggests that 
analysts tend to give overly optimistic forecasts, Hilary and Hsu observe the tendency for sell-
side analysts to intentionally produce estimates below the outcomes, i.e., lowballing. 
 
Furthermore, analysts are incentivized to do a good job since they are evaluated on their 
projections and thus being accurate may lead to a successful career, as examined by Hong and 
Kubik (2003). However, this may lead to analysts’ hesitation to disagree with the consensus 
because it could risk their reputation and, in the worst-case scenario, their employment. The 
effect that forecasts has on career can, by this reasoning instead, be regarded as a disadvantage 
due to potential management bias and fear of contrarian projections, which in turn might lead 
to inaccurate estimations.  
 
It is arguably easy to evaluate analyst performance in hindsight, which makes them vulnerable 
to criticism. Questions about analyst performance have been recurring throughout time 
(Dreman and Berry, 1995) and are still as relevant as ever. In this paper we investigate whether 
financial forecasts are valuable at all.
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1.2 Purpose 
 
We study the financial forecasting landscape and evaluate analyst accuracy for U.S. stocks in 
2009–2018. As previous studies by Timmerman (2018), and Dreman and Berry (1995) 
conclude, there are several difficulties and challenges in financial forecasting. Analysts 
forecasts are hardly a new aspect in the field of finance and their work has a strong impact on 
the financial markets. It is important to examine historical forecasts to evaluate if in fact they 
are worth their price.  
 
More specifically this paper aims to determine if forecasts of financial earnings are valuable at 
all. Furthermore, it investigates how the predictiveness of the forecasted earnings is affected by 
company size. Finally, individual analyst firms are compared against one another and ranked 
by predictiveness with the ambition to create a more predictive model than an equally weighted 
consensus. This set of problems leads us to our main research question: are analysts’ forecasts 
valuable in predicting earnings per share? 
 
1.3 Hypotheses  
 
Dreman and Berry (1995) suggest that forecasting errors have been frequent in the past and are 
consistent throughout business cycles. We evaluate analysts’ earnings per share projections and 
assess whether it has been something to attribute weight to during the last ten years. Our first 
hypothesis is to investigate if analysts’ forecasts of EPS for U.S. stocks were predictive in 
2009–2018.  
 
Consensus forecasts are generally more predictive than individual forecasts (Clements, 2015). 
Smaller companies in our sample are usually covered by only a handful of analysts whilst larger 
companies are more intensively covered (Appendix IV). Therefore, the consensus of the larger 
companies will contain more individual estimates which mean that it is less affected by potential 
outliers amongst the estimates. Furthermore, Dichev and Tang (2009) suggest that earnings 
predictability and earnings volatility are negatively correlated, which in this case would further 
highlight the difficulty in predicting the earnings of smaller companies. The proposed 
difficulties in forecasting companies of different size leads to our second hypothesis, which is 
that the predictive power of larger U.S. companies EPS is greater than for smaller companies.   
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As Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) suggest, analysts tend to come to different conclusions even 
though they use the same public information. Analyst interpretation of information is therefore 
directly decisive in the accuracy of individual analyst firms. For our third hypothesis we 
investigate whether some analyst firms are more accurate in predicting EPS than others and 
should be given more consideration when making investment decisions.  
 
The results from the third hypothesis gives us the means necessary to create differently 
weighted models with the ambition to outperform the equally weighted consensus.  
 
1.4 Summary of Results 
 
We find statistical evidence that analysts’ forecasts of EPS have predictive power. Furthermore, 
we find that the predictive power is greater in forecasts for larger companies, included in S&P 
500, relative to smaller companies, included in Russell 2000. Finally, after creating differently 
weighted models based on the analyst firms predictiveness, we could not conclude that 
differently weighted models outperform an equally weighted consensus with statistical 
significance. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Timmermann (2018) highlights several of the key challenges in financial forecasting. Some of 
these difficulties in establishing predictability are low signal-to-noise ratio, persistent 
predictors, and model instability. These all stem from an information overload in one way or 
another. However, these challenges do not only portray the difficulties in financial forecasting 
but also demonstrate why analysts come to different conclusions in forecasting even though 
they use the same information. The emphasis should, therefore, be on interpretation of 
information. Furthermore, Timmermann discusses forecasting methods with the ambition to 
overcome these predictability challenges. On the topic of forecasting methods, Genre, Kenny 
et al. (2012), model the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) to see if there are any 
benefits in combining methods to outperform the equally weighted consensus estimate. 
Methods such as principal components and trimmed means, performance-based weighting, 
least square estimates of optimal weights and Bayesian shrinkage. They find that no single 
model dominates throughout the sample and that the combined models were not statistically 
significant. This leads them to conclude that there is no case to replace equal weighting in 
preference to the combination models on the forecasts of the ECB SPF. Similarly, Clements 
(2015) researches if survey forecasters can outperform a simple time-series model in which 
variables move monotonically towards the long run expectation.1 For some economic variables, 
he finds that the survey consensus forecasts are superior to the time-series model. The 
consensus forecast is particularly accurate for CPI inflation, unemployment rate, and the 
Treasury bill rate. Finally, his research suggests that for most individual forecasters it would be 
beneficial to make simple mechanical adjustments to improve their accuracy.  
 
Accurate forecasting in finance is arguably difficult, which has been demonstrated in several 
studies. Dreman and Berry (1995) look at 66.100 consensus estimates in 1974–1991 to evaluate 
potential analyst forecasting errors. Their results are consistent with other research showing that 
analysts tend to be too optimistic when issuing forecasts (Sedor, 2002). Furthermore, they find 
the forecasting errors to be consistent through business cycles and across industries during the  
                                                          
1 The long-term target is divided by the number of periods to get the expected change within each 
period. 
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time period, which indicates that analyst errors are in fact present independently of 
circumstances. They also find that forecasting errors are more frequent than previously 
anticipated as well as increasing throughout the observed period. This confirms the belief that 
forecasting errors are frequent and highlights the difficulty in attributing significance to 
analysts’ projections. Dichev and Tang (2009) suggest how company size will affect the analyst 
firms forecasting accuracy. They conclude that there is a negative relationship between 
earnings’ volatility and predictability. Smaller companies tend to have more fluctuations in their 
earnings whilst larger companies are more stable and reliable. The earnings’ volatility will, by 
this reasoning, naturally impact the predictability of earnings. Furthermore, coverage depends 
on the size of a company, with a positive correlation between analyses issued and market value 
(Appendix IV). Whilst bigger companies are intensively covered, relatively small companies 
tend to have less analyst coverage which could make the consensus estimate less accurate. 
 
However, difficulty is not the only factor that complicates forecasting. In many cases an 
analyst’s bias—either unintentional or intentional, plays an important role. Sedor (2002) gives 
reasons for unintentional bias in financial forecasting. She argues that financial analysts tend to 
be optimistic rather than pessimistic, especially when it comes to companies with recent losses. 
More specifically she tests whether forecast optimism is a consequence of an analyst’s reaction 
to the structure of information about managers’ future plans. She concludes that when an analyst 
is offered thoroughly explained information from the managers, rather than as written lists, they 
are more inclined to give an optimistic estimate over the coming two years. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the effect was stronger when the firm had suffered a recent loss, which 
could have implications on forecasting for smaller companies which are more prone to losses. 
These results encourage the view that there might be some harm in too much interaction with 
executive officers or other managerial staff. Managers are often skilled at portraying their 
company’s future plans as exciting, which corresponds with the thoroughly explained 
information versus list argument, and in turn mislead analysts. Finally, she argues that analysts 
might add an intentional bias to maintain a sound relationship with the management, which 
could be damaged by a pessimistic forecast. Furthermore, Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) suggest 
that forecasters are consistently unintentionally biased. By researching the ECB Survey of 
Professional Forecasters, they find that even when using the same inputs forecasters come to 
different conclusions. Furthermore, they propose that the disagreements and bias stem in part
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from inattentiveness,2 where they find that twenty percent of the observed forecasters do not 
incorporate new information released each quarter.  
 
Intentional bias, where the analyst themselves add a bias in the forecast, is widely covered in 
research. Hong and Kubik (2003) provide possible explanations for this phenomenon. They 
conclude that accurate financial forecasters are more likely to have relatively better career 
opportunities. They suggest that this leads to a conservative approach where analysts tend to 
forecast earnings close to what they expect the consensus to be, contrary to the earnings that 
they truly expect. An inaccurate forecast far from the consensus is worse than an equally 
inaccurate forecast in line with the consensus because it is, in the worst case, as inaccurate as 
the majority. Moreover, Hong and Kubik observe a positive relationship between a sell-side 
analyst being more positive than consensus and more favourable career opportunities. This is 
explained by the benefits it has to the investment bank in generating banking business and 
brokerage fees. These economic advantages give support to their findings that the positive 
relationship is stronger when observing analysts who covered stocks underwritten by their own 
analyst firms because it has a direct effect on their own revenue. Hilary and Hsu (2013) suggest 
that analysts who deliver more consistent forecasting errors have a greater ability to move 
prices, i.e., bigger market impact. Additionally, in line with Hong and Kubik, they show that 
the analyst performance has consequences for the analysts’ careers. In this case, however, in 
forecasting error consistency. They claim that it is better to be consistently wrong than 
inconsistently inaccurate. A more consistent analyst is less likely to be demoted to less 
prestigious brokerage houses and more likely to be nominated to the All-Star Analysts list by 
Institutional Investor magazine. Furthermore, they also conclude that accurate analysts have a 
greater impact on prices than inaccurate analysts. Aligned with Sedor (2002), Hilary and Hsu 
(2013) also explain why forecasts might be biased. They claim that analysts might intentionally 
add a downward bias, known as lowballing, to help the managers beat their estimates. This 
could in the long run have a positive impact on the relationship between the analyst and the 
manager, which could make the analysts’ job easier because the managers are more 
accommodating towards them. Consequently, the biased forecasters will be more consistent 
and more informative than unbiased forecasters, rewarding the lowballing analysts for their foul 
play.  
 
                                                          
2 Failure to revise forecasts when new information is available. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Earnings Per Share 
 
We base our study on Earnings Per Share (EPS) ratio. EPS is a simple measure that facilitates 
comparisons of companies even though the size may differ. However, the EPS ratio can be 
viewed differently depending on one’s perspective. There is the realized EPS, which as earlier 
mentioned is simply the company’s earnings divided by the number of shares. From an analyst’s 
perspective the model is extended to capture the fact that it is a forecast of expected events. The 
forecasted EPS proposed by Keane and Runkle (1998) reads as following: 
 
1 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑛,𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1
𝑗 |𝐼𝑛,𝑡) (1)     
 
where, 𝑡 denotes the year, 𝑗 denotes the firm, 𝑛 denotes the analyst, and 𝐼𝑛,𝑡 is the information 
set that is available to the analyst 𝑛 at time 𝑡. The emphasis is on the information set because it 
is the base of the projections. Furthermore, the information set will be subject to the covering 
analyst interpretation and inattention as discussed by Andrade and Le Bihan (2013). Naturally, 
some information of a company will be available to the public whilst some depends on the 
relationship between the analyst and the forecasted company (Hillary and Hsu, 2013). Whatever 
approach the analyst utilizes to arrive at the forecasted earnings—it will be dependent on 
available information, which tends to depend on the size of the analysed company. Information 
that could consist of current projects, competitor analysis, interaction with managers, etc. The 
varying information but most importantly interpretation of the individual analyst leads to 
different EPS forecasts.  
 
3.2 Fixed Effects Panel Regression 
 
A fixed effects model is often used with panel data and is a model in which the group means 
are fixed. Compared to a standard regression model the fixed effects model enables a causal 
effect to be observed under weaker assumptions. Fixed effects regressions provide unbiased 
estimates if unobserved confounders are present, in contrast to a standard regression which 
provides biased estimates of causal effect. By this reasoning, a model with fixed effects is 
particularly appropriate in the context of causal inference (Brüderl and Ludwig, 2014). The 
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model on which we base part of our study is a panel regression with analyst and time fixed 
effects as described by the following equation: 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖 (2) 
where 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖 denotes the reported EPS, 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 denotes the previous quarters EPS, 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 denotes the consensus forecast issued by the analysts, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
error term, 𝜂𝑡 denotes time fixed effects, and 𝜉𝑖 denotes firm fixed effects. The main goal of the 
model is to find if 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 is predictive of 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖. The 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 is included to 
facilitate a comparison between the analyst consensus estimate as a predictor and observing the 
previous quarter’s earnings and expecting earnings based on this. The inclusion of time fixed 
effects is to control for time variations for the variable 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖, while firm fixed effects aims 
to control for differences across individual analyst firms. 
 
3.3 Diebold-Mariano tests 
 
A Diebold-Mariano test is commonly used when two or more forecasting models on the same 
variable of interest is available. In this thesis the DM test is utilized to determine whether 
forecasts issued by competing analyst firms differ with statistical significance. The model, 
presented by Diebold and Mariano (1995), is based directly on predictive performance and can 
be tailored to fit different settings. The DM test builds on the residuals of forecasting errors 
where the residual is defined as: 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 (3) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 denotes the forecast, 𝑦𝑡 denotes the outcome, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 denotes the residual. The 
complete equation for calculating the DM-statistic reads as following: 
 
𝐷𝑀 =
?̅?
√[𝛾0 + 2∑𝑘=1
ℎ−1𝛾𝑘]
𝑛
(4)
 
 
 
where, 𝑑 is the difference of the forecasts’ residuals squared, ?̅? denotes the average of 𝑑 
throughout the time period of observation, 𝛾 is autocovariance, ℎ is equal to 𝑛1/3 + 1, 𝑘 is lag, 
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and 𝑛 is number of observations. The DM test allows for other accuracy methods to be used 
compared to previously developed tests. Forecast errors can have a mean not equal to zero, and 
be serially correlated, contemporaneously correlated and non-Gaussian (Diebold and Mariano, 
1995).
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4. Data 
 
Our sample consists of one hundred randomly selected U.S. companies, divided into four parts 
containing 25 companies each taken from different size categories (Appendix I). The categories 
are: (i) the one hundred largest companies in the S&P 500 index, (ii) the one hundred smallest 
companies in the S&P 500 index, (iii) the range of 900–1000 in the Russell 2000 index, and 
(iv) the range of 1900–2000 in the Russell 2000 index. This sample gives us a good variety of 
differently sized companies with different coverage and the means necessary to compare larger 
to smaller companies.  
 
For each company we obtain consensus earnings per share estimates on a quarterly basis, 
reported earnings per share on a quarterly basis (ADJ+ comparable), and number of analysts 
for each quarter (Appendix IV), for 2009–2018. This data comes from Bloomberg (retrieved on 
March 27, 2019). This data is used to test Hypothesis I and II. 
 
The individual company’s analyst coverage for each quarter in 2009–2018, in Appendix IV, is 
summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Analysts Coverage 
 Top 100 from 
S&P 500 (i) 
400–500 from 
S&P 500 (ii) 
900–1000 from 
Russell 2000 (iii) 
1900–2000 from 
Russell 2000 (iv) 
25 Percentile 18.25 8.60 2.35 2.25 
75 Percentile 23.95 14.95 6.51 4.75 
Median 20.78 12.92 4.13 3.81 
Mean 21.45 13.51 5.58 3.84 
Standard 
Deviation 
5.11 6.51 4.59 1.87 
Table containing summary statistics for analyst coverage per consensus estimate across S&P 500 and Russell 
2000 indices. 
From Table 1 it is visible that there is a positive correlation between analyses issued and market 
value. Companies from the Russell 2000 index are considerably less covered than the 
companies from the S&P 500 index. Furthermore, the observed relationship seems not only to
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be viable for comparison across the two indices but also within the indices themselves. 
Companies from category (i) are more intensively covered than companies from category (ii), 
and companies from category (iii) are more intensively covered than companies from category 
(iv).  
 
In addition to the data from Bloomberg, we obtain individual analyst firms quarterly EPS 
estimates from Reuters for 2016–2018 (retrieved on April 4, 2019). Detailed historical forecasts 
are only available for 2016–2018 and, therefore, the analysis of Hypothesis III uses a shorter 
sample period than Hypothesis I and II. This data is used to test Hypothesis III and serves as a 
base for the weighted models in Subsection 5.4.
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5. Results 
 
This part of the thesis presents our results and discussions related to the hypotheses outlined in 
the introduction. It is presented with tables summarizing the regressions for each individual 
hypothesis followed by an econometric analysis, and a discussion of the findings. We use a 
significance level of five percent to determine if our results are significant.  
 
5.1 Analyst Accuracy 
 
To answer Hypothesis I (predictiveness of analysts’ forecasts of EPS for U.S. stocks in 2009–
2018) we use consensus EPS projections by analysts and compare them to actual outcomes in 
the financial statements. We measure accuracy of the consensus estimate by looking at its 
forecast error. To investigate the efficiency of the analyst’s forecasts, we run a panel regression 
for which the sample period is 2009–2018. The panel dataset is unbalanced with gaps where 
there is no available data. The reason there is no data is because the companies were either not 
listed or lacked coverage for the time period. To test our first hypothesis, we run six regressions. 
First, we run a panel regression without fixed effects (i). Furthermore, we run two regressions, 
testing each of the separate variables with fixed effects. In (ii) we have time fixed effects and 
in (iii) we have analyst fixed effects. Finally, we run the panel regression with time and analyst 
fixed effects to conclude whether the forecasts are on average predictive (iv). To test the 
robustness of the results from regressions (i)–(iv) we run two additional univariate regressions. 
The regressions are run with clustered standard errors for the individual companies.
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Table 2: Analyst Accuracy 
 Coefficicent SE t-value p-value 𝑅2 Observations 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (𝑖) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 0.197 0.101 19.32 0.000 0.864 3313 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑡−1
 0.799 0.100 79.58 0.000   
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 (𝑖𝑖) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 0.197 0.099 1.97 0.049 0.866 3313 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑡−1
 0.799 0.155 5.15 0.000   
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖 (𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 0.184 0.087 2.11 0.035 0.867 3313 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑡−1
 0.793 0.170 4.66 0.000   
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖 (𝑖𝑣) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 0.183 0.086 2.12 0.034 0.869 3313 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑡−1
 0.792 0.169 4.68 0.000   
Regression (i): Panel regression without fixed effects. Regression (ii) Panel regression with time fixed effects but 
not analyst fixed effects. Regression (iii): Panel regression with analyst fixed effects but not time fixed effects. 
Regression (iv): Panel regression with time and analyst fixed effects. 
In table 2 we can see that the four regressions all have high t-values and low p-values, below 
our threshold of five percent significance level. Furthermore, the high 𝑅2 for the regressions 
leads us to believe that the models have some explanatory power. Even though we test for all 
different combinations of time and analyst fixed, all four regressions generate very similar 
coefficients of the lagged EPS and Forecasted EPS. We can therefore conclude that the
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estimated relationship between EPS, lagged EPS and Forecasted EPS is not affected by omitted 
variable bias due to factors that are constant over time. This conclusion, in combination with 
the similar coefficients which serve as a robustness test, strengthens our observation. The low 
p-values, in conjunction with the high coefficients on Forecasted EPS in relation to lagged EPS, 
allows us to confirm that analysts’ forecasts are more predictive of future EPS than relying on 
last quarter’s EPS.  
 
In addition to the regressions with the independent variables lagged EPS and Forecasted EPS 
we run two univariate regressions with one independent variable in each of the models. In model 
(v), with lagged EPS as the independent variable, we use time fixed effects. In model (vi), with 
Forecasted EPS as the independent variable, we use analyst fixed effects. 
Table 3: Univariate Regressions 
 
Coefficicent SE t-value p-value 𝑅2 Observations 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 (𝑣) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 0.795 0.089 8.86 0.000 0.61 3482 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖 (𝑣𝑖) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑡−1
 0.909 0.096 9.38 0.000 0.856 3415 
Regression (v): Panel regression with time fixed effects, EPS lagged as the independent variable and EPS as the 
dependent variable. Regression (vi): Panel regression with analyst fixed effects, Forecasted EPS as the 
independent variable and EPS as the dependent variable. 
The coefficient for lagged EPS in the univariate regression (v) exceeds the coefficients from 
table 2 with a wide margin. When only including lagged EPS as an independent variable it 
shows a clear relationship with the actual outcome of EPS. Furthermore, the t-value is high 
enough to indicate that the relationship is statistically significant. However, the Forecasted EPS 
still has a coefficient closer to one. This coupled with the high t-value and 𝑅2 strengthens our 
belief that analysts’ forecasts have more predictive value than lagged EPS. 
 
Table 2 and 3 clearly display the relationship between the higher Forecasted EPS relative to the 
lagged EPS. However, when analyzing the results, the timing of the data must be considered. 
Lagged EPS is, as earlier mentioned, based on the previous quarters EPS, which means that the
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data is approximately four months old. On the other side, forecasted EPS is an average of the 
forecasts from the individual analyst firms. These are generally released within the last weeks 
before the company reports its earnings and are therefore the results of close to four months’ 
worth of information. Also, they are often associated with costs as opposed to the lagged EPS 
which is free. An argument could therefore be made that these factors make the comparison 
unviable. However, this argument overlooks the key aspect and purpose of financial analysts 
and their forecasts—gathering, interpreting, and summarizing information. The comparison 
between the Forecasted EPS and lagged EPS is therefore valid if one considers the potential 
costs that can be associated with the analysts forecast, but also the aspect of time.  
 
It is important that investors are informed about analysts’ predictive power in forecasting and 
if it is worthwhile to follow their advice. Our findings lead us to conclude that analysts are 
predictive of future earnings per share. Analysts’ forecasts have more predictive value than the 
last quarter’s EPS in forecasting, which is observed by the high difference between the two 
explanatory variables in regression (iv). The relationship suggests that analysts’ forecasts on 
EPS should be considered when making investments. However, as mentioned previously, 
forecasts tend to be associated with costs which must be taken into consideration. The 
predictiveness of the consensus estimate in our thesis contradicts the previous findings of 
Dreman and Berry (1995) who find that the average forecasting errors is high enough to 
question the usefulness of analysts and suggest that investors should not rely on consensus 
estimates. 
 
5.2 Company Size Effect on Analyst Accuracy 
 
To answer Hypothesis II (predictiveness of analysts’ forecasts for smaller versus larger U.S. 
companies), we use the same data as for Hypothesis I. We extend our model to include a size 
dummy where an inclusion in S&P 500 indicates a large company and an inclusion in Russell 
2000 indicates a small company. We research the potential difficulty in forecasting reliable 
consensus estimates for small companies versus for large ones as measured by market value, 
i.e., what influence company size has on the analysts predictiveness. This is completed by a 
panel regression with time and analyst fixed effects, and with interaction and dummy variables 
representing large and small companies. The regression is run with clustered standard errors for 
the individual companies.
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Table 4: Company Size Effect on Analyst Accuracy 
 Coefficicent SE t-value p-value 𝑅2 Observations 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1𝑥 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖(𝑣𝑖𝑖) 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 0.186 0.094 1.99 0.046 0.805 3313 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙
 0.766 0.187 4.09 0.000   
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒
 0.899 0.055 16.35 0.000   
Panel regression with time and analyst fixed effects, and with interaction between Forecasted EPS and a dummy 
variable representing small and large companies. 
The model (vii) allows us to compare the relationship and significance of forecasting on small 
relative to large companies. The t- and p-values indicate that all explanatory variables are 
significant at a five percent level. The 𝑅2 confirms that the model has some explanatory power. 
With the inclusion of an interaction term and a dummy variable for size we are able to 
incorporate the effect size has on the coefficients. The coefficient of the Forecasted EPS on 
larger companies is considerably higher than the coefficient of the Forecasted EPS on smaller 
companies. Interpreting the coefficients of the estimated EPS leads us to conclude that analysts 
were more accurate in their forecasts on large companies relative to small companies in 2009–
2018. Thus, we can verify that company size has an effect on analyst forecasting accuracy. 
 
The results that analysts are more accurate in their forecasts for larger than smaller companies 
correspond with expectations based on previous studies such as Dichev and Tang (2009). They 
state that smaller companies tend to have more volatile earnings, which in turn affects the 
predictability of earnings. Naturally, these fluctuations in earnings for smaller companies makes 
it difficult to forecast with precision. Vice versa, larger companies are generally more stable in 
terms of growth, earnings and cash flows, which simplifies forecasting. Furthermore, regulation 
differs across indices. In order to be included in S&P 500 the company must report profits for 
five consecutive quarters (S&P U.S. Indices Methodology, 2019). Russell 2000 does not have 
the same requirements (Russell U.S. Equity Indexes). This leads to exclusively profitable 
companies in S&P 500 index, whilst companies in the Russell 2000 index possibly could have
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recent losses. Sedor (2002) suggests, that there is a tendency for analysts to be overly optimistic 
in forecasting companies with recent losses. This unintentional bias increases the potential for 
more frequent errors for companies in the Russell 2000. The general difference in regulation 
for the two indices could therefore possibly have implications on the accuracy of the forecasts.  
 
An additional aspect that could contribute to the discrepancy between large and small 
companies is the more intense analyst coverage for the larger ones. More analysts should 
reasonably lead to a more reliable consensus estimate since it incorporates many different 
opinions and generates a more balanced average. For instance, Facebook, included in the S&P 
500 index, averages 28.7 analyst estimates per quarter whilst Remark Holdings Inc, included in 
the Russell 2000 index, averages one analyst estimate per quarter. This vast difference of 
analyst coverage between the two indices is apparent throughout our sample where the 
companies from the S&P 500 average 17.5 analysts whilst the companies in the Russell 2000 
average 4.7 (Appendix IV).  
 
5.3 Individual Analyst Firm Accuracy 
 
  
To answer Hypothesis III (predictiveness of individual analyst firms), we use the individual 
analyst firm estimates from Reuters for 2016–2018. We investigate the performance of 
individual analyst firms to gauge their relative predictiveness. This gives us the means 
necessary for comparing the firms on their forecasting accuracy. This comparison is 
accomplished with the use of the Diebold-Mariano test to observe which forecasters are the 
most accurate and inaccurate.  
 
When calculating the DM-statistics we produce a matrix with the 123 analyst firms in our 
sample on the axes. Two analyst firms only generate DM-statistics if they have forecasted 
earnings for the same company and during the same quarter as another analyst firm in more 
than one quarter. If a cell in the matrix is blank it means that there are not more than one 
comparative quarter between two analyst firms. Which, for instance, is the case between 
Avondale Partners and Obsidian Research Group in Figure 1. The maximum possible number
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of comparable DM-statistics for our sample would be 7503.3 After excluding the quarters where 
𝑛 was not higher than one we arrive at the complete matrix which contains 1092 DM-statistics.4  
Figure 1: Subset of DM-Statistics 
 
Excerpt from the full matrix containing all analyst firms on the axes. The matrix contains all DM-statistics for 
when analyst firms has issued forecasts for the same company and time-period in more than one quarter. 
Figure 1 shows a subset of the complete matrix that contains the DM-statistics for the analyst 
firms. If the value is positive/negative the firm in the column produced smaller/larger forecast 
squared errors than the company in the row. For instance, this suggests that Avondale Partners 
have performed worse than Raymond James and William Blair & Company. A DM-statistic 
larger than 1.96 in absolute values is significant at a five percent level. This implies that 
Avondale Partners comparative values are not statistically significant.   
 
After running the DM-test, the different significance levels of the complete matrix are 
illustrated in Figure 2. The DM-statistics are mainly centred around zero, which is depicted by 
the dimly coloured squares. As observable, most forecasters do not produce significantly 
better/worse forecasts and are excluded with a typical statistical threshold. Accordingly, 
different significance levels do not have big implications for the analysis in this case.
                                                          
3 Actually, there are 15006 DM-statistics. However, each one is mirrored one time as can be observed 
in the comparative values between Avondale Partners, LLC and Raymond James. Where the DM-
statistic is -0.452 and 0.452 respectively. 15006/2=7503. 
4 2184/2=1092. 
AVONDALE PARTNERS, LLC RAYMOND JAMES WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY
AVONDALE PARTNERS, LLC 0.452 0.098
RAYMOND JAMES -0.452 -0.095
WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY -0.098 0.095
OBSIDIAN RESEARCH GROUP
CANTOR FITZGERALD 0.215 0.354
ATLANTIC EQUITIES -0.088 -0.167
CREDIT SUISSE 0.070 -0.126
EVERCORE ISI 0.022 -0.139
GUGGENHEIM SECURITIES LLC 0.122 -0.196
PIPER JAFFRAY 0.088 -0.018
SUNTRUST ROBINSON HUMPHREY CAPITAL MARKETS 0.121 -0.002
SVB LEERINK -0.216 -0.028
WOLFE RESEARCH -0.231 -0.386
BTIG 0.140 0.151
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 Figure 2: DM-Statistic 
 
The figure represents the full matrix with DM-statistics but with colours instead of values, with the analyst firms 
on both axes. The boxes are the analyst firms’ colour-coded DM-statistics where a dimly shaded box represents a 
DM-statistic close to zero. 
 
To better depict the significant values at a five percent level we filter out the insignificant values 
and remove them from the analysis, illustrated in Appendix III. There are not that many 
occasions where we can observe different analyst firms’ forecasts for the same company and 
time-period that are statistically significant at a five percent level. This means that from the 
original matrix containing 1092 comparative occasions we are left with a matrix with only 42 
DM-statistics (Appendix III).5 The small sample size is a contributing factor to the high p-
values and insignificant DM-statistics. Our uncertainty about whether the analyst firms 
outperformed each other or not would decrease with a larger sample size. Since there are not 
that many comparable occasions for the analyst firms only very large differences in 
performance yields a small p-value.
                                                          
5 84/2=42. 
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Figure 3: Selected Performers 
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RAYMOND JAMES
WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY
CANTOR FITZGERALD
ATLANTIC EQUITIES
EVERCORE ISI
GUGGENHEIM SECURITIES LLC
PIPER JAFFRAY
SUNTRUST ROBINSON HUMPHREY -1.963
WOLFE RESEARCH
BTIG
STIFEL NICOLAUS AND COMPANY
KEYBANC CAPITAL MARKETS INC.
BWS FINANCIAL 2.039
B.RILEY FBR, INC. 1.964 -2.038
DOUGHERTY & COMPANY LLC
GRIFFIN SECURITIES, INC. 3.968 -3.118 2.293
JMP SECURITIES
OPPENHEIMER & CO., INC. 2.293
PACIFIC CREST SECURITIES-KBCM
STEPHENS INC.
SUSQUEHANNA FINANCIAL GROUP LLLP
WUNDERLICH SECURITIES
WEDBUSH SECURITIES INC.
JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT LLC 2.725
MACQUARIE RESEARCH
LONGBOW RESEARCH 2.679
SEAPORT GLOBAL SECURITIES LLC
IMPERIAL CAPITAL, LLC -4.871
THE BUCKINGHAM RESEARCH GROUP
BERENBERG 3.142
CRT CAPITAL
NOMURA SECURITIES INTL (AMERICA) -3.868
ASCENDIANT CAPITAL MARKETS
MILLMAN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 2.544
MKM PARTNERS
NEEDHAM & COMPANY INC.
D.A. DAVIDSON & COMPANY 2.187
SCOTIA HOWARD WEIL 2.464
CJS SECURITIES
ALEMBIC GLOBAL ADVISORS 3.272
FELTL & COMPANY 3.662
SCOTIABANK GBM
TD SECURITIES
B. RILEY & CO. -2.4822 3.422
NORTHLAND SECURITIES 3.708 -5.565
HUBER RESEARCH PARTNERS -2.345
CRAIG HALLUM
FBN SECURITIES -2.793 2.276
MONNESS, CRESPI, HARDT, & CO INC. -1.994
AEGIS CAPITAL 12.027
CRISPIDEA
SUMMIT INSIGHTS GROUP
NEPHRON RESEARCH 2.592 2.214
Excerpt from Appendix III which is a matrix where all insignificant DM-statistics are excluded. 
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As observed in Figure 3, which is a subset of Appendix III, there are some analyst firms that 
have been outperforming their peers in forecasting EPS, whilst some analyst firms have been 
underperforming in their predictions. As seen in the green coloured columns, there are three 
analyst firms that outperform their competitors in all three tests with statistical significance. 
These are: Atlantic Equities, Keybanc Capital Market Inc, and Dougherty & Company LLC. 
Furthermore, there is one analyst firm that underperformed in all three tests with statistical 
significance: Cantor Fitzgerald.  
 
However, it is difficult to draw too drastic conclusions from the three most accurate analyst 
firms or the poor performing Cantor Fitzgerald. To fully determine if they are better or worse 
at forecasting than their competitors, a larger sample size would be needed. To further the 
analysis and determine if their accuracy stems from being more prone to bias than the others, 
we would have to take a more qualitative approach.  
 
Even though a larger sample size would be preferable, the results bring some insight into the 
difference in accuracy of analyst firms. The results from the Diebold-Mariano test are in line 
with Hypothesis III and suggests that some analyst firms are more accurate in predicting EPS 
than others and should be given more consideration when making investment decisions. 
 
5.4 Alternative Consensus Models 
 
To expand on the outcome of the Diebold-Mariano test we create our own consensus models 
that attribute weight based on past performance in forecasting EPS. A historically more accurate 
analyst firm receives a higher weight than a less accurate firm. The differently weighted models 
are then compared with the equally weighted consensus to illustrate the accuracy of the models.  
 
To fairly observe the accuracy and test the performance of the models we divide the dataset 
into two parts—training and test set. The first two years (2016–2017) determines the 
composition of the models whilst the third year (2018) serves as an evaluation for the 
performance of the models. This division helps us to avoid look-ahead bias.6 ‘Consensus’ gives 
equal weight to all analyst firms in the data set. The ‘Performance Based’ model only includes
                                                          
6 A bias that occurs when a study relies on data that was not yet available during the time period of 
study.  
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analyst firms that have outperformed other analyst firms with statistical significance and weigh 
these based on the number of firms which they have outperformed. For instance, the 
outperforming Atlantic Equities, Keybanc Capital Market Inc, and Dougherty & Company LLC 
receives a weight of three since they all outperformed three competitors with statistical 
significance. The ‘Performance Based +1’ model is similar to the ‘Performance Based’ model 
but includes analyst firms that have neither outperformed nor underperformed (others). 
Furthermore, in the ‘Excluding’ model all analyst firms not underperforming are equally 
weighted i.e., outperformers and others. The ‘Performance Based′2’ model skews weights more 
towards the outperforming firms. For example, the three outperforming analyst firms receive a 
weight of nine instead of previously three. The DM-statistics of the models with different 
weights are summarized in Table 5. The values indicate how accurate the models are at 
predicting EPS in 2018. As in the previous figures, the models in the columns that have a 
positive value indicate that they are more predictive than the corresponding model in the rows, 
and vice versa.  
Table 5: Weighted Models 
 Consensus Performance 
Based 
Performance 
Based +1 
Excluding Performance
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑2 
Consensus  0.108 0.089 0.083 -0.100 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑
 -0.108  -0.044 -0.117 -0.113 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 + 1
 -0.089 0.044  -0.097 -0.093 
Excluding -0.083 0.017 0.097  -0.088 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑2
 0.100 0.113 0.093 0.088  
Table showcasing the DM-statistics of the weighted models. A positive value in the cell means the model in the 
column produces a lower squared forecast error than the model in the row. 
Of the models, ‘Performance Based’, model produces the lowest squared forecast errors, 
outperforming the remaining models. On the other hand, ‘Performance Based′2’
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produces the highest squared forecast errors of the five models, which indicates that it is not 
beneficial to attribute too much weight to the top analyst firms from 2016–2017. This means 
that they could not continue with their previous predictiveness. The consensus model performs 
slightly worse than all the remaining models except for ‘Performance Based′2’, which suggests 
that it may be possible to beat the consensus with weighted models. 
 
However, the DM-statistics are all close to zero, which corresponds with high p-values and 
insignificant differences among the models. Therefore, in line with Genre, Kenny et. al (2012), 
we cannot conclude that differently weighted models outperform the equally weighted 
consensus.
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6. Conclusions 
 
This thesis investigates if financial analysts’ forecasts are valuable at all. Analysts forecasts 
have been questioned (Dreman and Berry, 1995) throughout time because the general difficulty 
in forecasting (Timmermann, 2018), but also due to factors related to bias. Analysts are an 
integral part of the financial system and their work affects the stock market, at least in the short 
term (Hilary and Hsu, 2013). It is therefore of great importance to examine historical forecasts 
to evaluate if in fact they are worth their price.  
 
This paper finds statistically significant evidence that analysts are predictive when forecasting 
EPS. Analyst consensus estimates are far more predictive than relying on the last quarters EPS 
in forecasting. Furthermore, we conclude that company size has an effect on the predictive 
power of the consensus estimate. The consensus estimates for the companies included in the 
S&P 500 index are more accurate than for the companies included in the Russell 2000 index. 
Moreover, when exploring the accuracy of individual analyst firms, we find that some analyst 
firms outperformed their peers, whilst others underperformed. However, it is hard to draw any 
drastic conclusion from the limited data sample and a non-qualitative approach. Finally, we 
explore the possibility of outperforming the equally weighted consensus with differently 
weighted models. We observe a tendency for the consensus model to produce higher squared 
forecast errors than our own models, which implies that the created models are more predictive 
in forecasting. However, the DM-statistics are all low which indicates insignificant differences 
among the models. Therefore, we cannot draw the conclusion that differently weighted models 
outperform the equally weighted consensus.
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Appendix 
 
A.I: Sample Companies 
Top 100 from 
S&P 500 
400–500 from 
S&P 500 
900–1000 from 
Russell 2000 
1900–2000 from 
Russell 2000 
CVX FL TCX MARK 
FB XRX ETM BRS 
CMCSA ARNC ACCO CBFV 
AMT IPGP SXI AQUA 
ABT FBHS QUOT INAP 
SBUX NWL TPC QHC 
INTU TRIP OMER ROX 
ORCL RJF CETV SUP 
PNC LB UTL ICBK 
UNH MHK MLAB SURF 
PM AIV AKS SELB 
CHTR ROL DNR VERI 
BKNG WHR GFF PFSW 
NKE ALLE TDW XOMA 
ADBE HSIC ARCB OPBK 
COP CF TYPE AAC 
ABBV WRK EXTR NH 
MDLZ JNPR WAIR AVEO 
MSFT COTY OIS KIRK 
GS CBOE QADA BW 
JNJ LKQ JBSS CSU 
DUK NLSN UBA CMRX 
PG HBI ECPG CBIO 
GILD MOS CLDT HOV 
AMGN WU HMHC IDRA 
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A.II: Literature Summary 
Author Summary 
Andrade and Le 
Bihan (2013) 
Forecasters are consistently biased and come to different 
conclusions even though they use the same information 
Clements (2015) Difficulties of individual forecasts 
Dichev and Tang 
(2009) 
Negative relationship between earnings’ volatility and predictability 
Dreman and Berry 
(1995) 
Empirical research which concludes that forecasting errors are 
consistent and tend to be overly optimistic 
Hilary and Hsu 
(2013) 
Forecasting error consistency leads to better career opportunities 
than inconsistent errors 
Hong and Kubik 
(2003) 
Analysts’ tend to forecast earnings close to consensus. Positive 
relationship between positive forecasters and favourable career 
opportunities 
Sedor (2002) Analysts’ tend to be more optimistic than pessimistic. Unintentional 
bias due to relationship with company’s executives 
Timmermann (2018) Highlights several difficulties and challenges in financial 
forecasting 
Genre, Kenny, et al. 
(2012) 
Examines if models can outperform the equally weighted average 
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RAYMWILLIA  BLAIR & COMPANYCANTOR FITZGERALDA LANTIC EQUITIESEVERCORE ISIG GG NHE M SECURITIES LLCPIPER JAFFRAYSUNTRUST ROB NSON HUMPHREY CAPITAL MARKETSWOLFE RESEARCHBTIGSTIF L NICOLAUS ND COMPANY, INCORPORATEDKEYBANC CAPITAL MA KETS INC.BWS FINANC ALB. IL Y FBR, INC.DOUGHE TY & COMPANY LLCGRIFFIN SECURITIES, INC.JMP SECURITIESOPPE HE MER & CO., INC.PACIFIC CREST SECURITIES-KBCMSTEPH NS IN .SUSQ HANNA FINANCIAL GROUP LLLPWUNDERLICH SECURITIESWEDBUSH SECURITIES INC.JANNEY MON GOMERY SCOTT LLCMACQUARIE RESEARCHLONGBOW RESEARCHSEAP RT GLOBAL SECURITIES LLCIMPERIAL CAPITA , LLCTHE BUCKINGHAM RESEARCH GROUPB RENBERGC T CA ITALNOMU A SECURITIES INTL (AMERICA)ASCENDIANT CAPITAL M RKETSMILLM N R SEARCH ASSOCIATESM M PARTNERNEEDHAM & COMPANY INC.D.A. DAVIDSON & OMPANYCOTIA HOW RD WEILCJS SECURITIESALEMBIC GLOBAL ADVISORSFELTL & COMPANYSC TI BANK GBMTD SECURITIESB. RILEY & CO.NORTHLAND SECURITIESHUBER RESEARCH PARTNERSRAIG HALLUMFBN ECURITIESMON ESS, CRESPI, HARDT, & CO INC.AEGIS CAPITALCRISPIDEASUMMIT INSIGHTS GROUPNEPHR
RAYM -3.14221 -2.5918
WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY -2.725 2.482
CANTOR FITZGERALD 3.868 2.793 1.994
ATLANTIC EQUITIES -2.544 -3.662 -3.422
EVERCORE ISI -3.708
GUGGENHEIM SECURITIES LLC -2.276
PIPER JAFFRAY -3.272
SUNTRUST ROBINSON HUMPHREY CAPITAL MARKETS -1.964 2.345
WOLFE RESEARCH -2.214
BTIG -2.679
STIFEL NICOLAUS AND COMPANY, INCORPORATED 4.871
KEYBANC CAPITAL MARKETS INC. -3.968 -2.464 -12.027
BWS FINANCIAL 2.039
B.RILEY FBR, INC. 1.96396 -2.039 3.118 5.565
DOUGHERTY & COMPANY LLC -2.293 -2.293 -2.187
GRIFFIN SECURITIES, INC. 3.968 -3.118 2.293 4.163
JMP SECURITIES 2.036
OPPENHEIMER & CO., INC. 2.293 -3.992
PACIFIC CREST SECURITIES-KBCM 2.677
STEPHENS INC. -2.677
SUSQUEHANNA FINANCIAL GROUP LLLP 2.024
WUNDERLICH SECURITIES 2.375 -2.194
WEDBUSH SECURITIES INC. -2.375 -3.01301
JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT LLC 2.725
MACQUARIE RESEARCH -4.163 4.05301
LONGBOW RESEARCH 2.679
SEAPORT GLOBAL SECURITIES LLC -3.661
IMPERIAL CAPITAL, LLC -4.871
THE BUCKINGHAM RESEARCH GROUP -2.510
BERENBERG 3.142
CRT CAPITAL -2.024
NOMURA SECURITIES INTL (AMERICA) -3.868
ASCENDIANT CAPITAL MARKETS -2.036
MILLMAN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 2.544
MKM PARTNERS 3.661
NEEDHAM & COMPANY INC. -2.394
D.A. DAVIDSON & COMPANY 2.187
SCOTIA HOWARD WEIL 2.464
CJS SECURITIES 3.91102
ALEMBIC GLOBAL ADVISORS 3.272 -3.91102
FELTL & COMPANY 3.662
SCOTIABANK GBM -3.088
TD SECURITIES 3.088
B. RILEY & CO. -2.482 3.422
NORTHLAND SECURITIES 3.708 -5.565 2.194
HUBER RESEARCH PARTNERS -2.345 -4.05301
CRAIG HALLUM 2.510
FBN SECURITIES -2.793 2.276
MONNESS, CRESPI, HARDT, & CO INC. -1.994 3.01301 -2.39
AEGIS CAPITAL 12.027 2.39
CRISPIDEA 3.992
SUMMIT INSIGHTS GROUP 2.39404
NEPHR 2.592 2.214
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A.IV: Average Number of Analysts 2009–2018 
Top 100 from 
S&P 500 
400–500 from 
S&P 500 
900–1000 from 
Russell 2000 
1900–2000 from 
Russell 2000 
CVX: 17.7 FL: 16.3 TCX: 1.7 MARK: 1 
FB: 28.7 XRX: 9.9 ETM: 2.2 BRS: 7.5 
CMCSA: 22.3 ARNC: 9 ACCO: 4.6 CBFV: 1.5 
AMT: 17.5 IPGP: 8.1 SXI: 2.5 AQUA: 7 
ABT: 18.8 FBHS: 15.3 QUOT: 3.6 INAP: 3.9 
SBUX: 23.3 NWL: 14 TPC: 4.7 QHC: 3.3 
INTU: 16.6 TRIP: 20.1 OMER: 4.8 ROX: 1.2 
ORCL: 35.3 RJF: 8.2 CETV: 5.5 SUP: 3.2 
PNC: 20.7 LB: 25.3 UTL: 2.8 ICBK: 3.8 
UNH: 20.6 MHK: 12.9 MLAB: 1.5 SURF: 2 
PM: 16.4 AIV: 2.9 AKS: 13.2 SELB: 4.7 
CHTR: 10.6 ROL: 2.8 DNR: 16.1 VERI: 2.5 
BKNG: 20.8 WHR: 7.1 GFF: 1.8 PFSW: 2.4 
NKE: 26.1 ALLE: 7.6 TDW: 4 XOMA: 4.6 
ADBE: 24.6 HSIC: 14.4 ARCB: 14.7 OPBK: 2 
COP: 19 CF: 13.8 TYPE: 4.1 AAC: 3.8 
ABBV: 15.3 WRK: 14 EXTR: 4.2 NH: 3.7 
MDLZ: 19.2 JNPR: 30.3 WAIR: 8.7 AVEO: 3.9 
MSFT: 29.4 COTY: 12.7 OIS: 16.2 KIRK: 4.3 
GS: 22.5 CBOE: 14.6 QADA: 1.5 BW: 4.8 
JNJ: 20.7 LKQ: 12.4 JBSS: 1.2 CSU: 7.6 
DUK: 20.2 NLSN: 12.8 UBA: 3.4 CMRX: 6.5 
PG: 20.8 HBI: 11.4 ECPG: 6.3 CBIO: 2 
GILD: 26.3 MOS: 17.4 CLDT: 3.7 HOV: 5.3 
AMGN: 23 WU: 24.6 HMHC: 6.7 IDRA: 3.7 
S&P 500 average: 17.5 Russell 2000 average: 4.7 
 
 
